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ABSTRACT
Objectives To describe and evaluate the implementation
and adoption of detailed electronic health records in
secondary care in England and thereby provide early
feedback for the ongoing local and national rollout of the
NHS Care Records Service.
Design A mixed methods, longitudinal, multisite, socio-
technical case study.
Setting Five NHS acute hospital and mental health trusts
that have been the focus of early implementation efforts
and at which interim data collection and analysis are
complete.
Data sources and analysis Dataset for the evaluation
consists of semi-structured interviews, documents and
field notes, observations, and quantitative data.
Qualitative data were analysed thematically with a socio-
technical coding matrix, combined with additional
themes that emerged from the data.
Main results Hospital electronic health record
applications are being developed and implemented far
more slowly than was originally envisioned; the top-
down, standardised approach has needed to evolve to
admit more variation and greater local choice, which
hospital trusts want in order to support local activity.
Despite considerable delays and frustrations, support for
electronic health records remains strong, including from
NHS clinicians. Political and financial factors are now
perceived to threaten nationwide implementation of
electronic health records. Interviewees identified a range
of consequences of long term, centrally negotiated
contracts to deliver the NHS Care Records Service in
secondary care, particularly as NHS trusts themselves are
not party to these contracts. These include convoluted
communication channels between different
stakeholders, unrealistic deployment timelines, delays,
and applications that could not quickly respond to
changing national and local NHS priorities. Our data
suggest support for a “middle-out” approach to
implementing hospital electronic health records,
combining government direction with increased local
autonomy, and for restricting detailed electronic health
record sharing to local health communities.
Conclusions Experiences from the early implementation
sites, which have received considerable attention,
financial investment and support, indicate that delivering
improved healthcare through nationwide electronic health
records will be a long, complex, and iterative process
requiring flexibility and local adaptability bothwith respect
to the systems and the implementation strategy. The more
tailored, responsive approach that is emerging is
becoming better aligned with NHS organisations’
perceived needs and is, if pursued, likely to deliver
clinically useful electronic health record systems.
INTRODUCTION
Electronic health records are being introduced in Eur-
ope, North America, Australasia, theMiddle East, and
elsewhere.1 2 There is no universally accepted defini-
tion of the term electronic health record, but we use it
to mean a digital, longitudinal record of a patient’s
health and health care that can be shared by different
healthcare providers.3 Although electronic health
records are widely viewed as central to modernising
the organisation and delivery of sustainable, high qual-
ity health care, the uptake of such records in hospital
has tended to be slow.4 Approaches to deployment of
electronic health records vary from home grown sys-
tems in single organisations with the necessary techni-
cal and managerial capacity; to interoperability
standards for linking multiple information technology
(IT) systems; to top-down, government driven,
national implementations of standardised, commercial
software applications. The last approachwas chosen in
England in 2002: the nationwide implementation of
electronic health records, known as the National
Health Service (NHS)CareRecords Service, is the cor-
nerstone of the £12.7bn National Programme for IT.5 6
1eHealth Research Group, Centre
for Population Health Sciences,
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh
EH8 9AG
2Department of Practice and
Policy, School of Pharmacy,
University of London, London
3Department of Management,
London School of Economics and
Political Science, London
4Division of Primary Care,
University of Nottingham,
Nottingham
5Imperial College Healthcare N
HS Trust, London
6Burton Hospitals NHS
Foundation Trust, Burton upon
Trent
Correspondence to: A Sheikh,
professor of primary care research
and development,
aziz.sheikh@ed.ac.uk
Cite this as: BMJ 2010;341:c4564
doi:10.1136/bmj.c4564
BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.com page 1 of 12
A limited range of standardised applications was to
be centrally procured and implemented in, initially,
five geographical clusters by centrally contracted
local service providers; these new systems were then
planned to connect to a national database and messa-
ging service (the NHS Spine). The resultingNHSCare
Records Service is thus in two parts7—a centrally
stored summary care record containing basic clinical
information for emergencies (which has been sepa-
rately evaluated89) and a locally held and shared
detailed electronic health record. The latter, detailed
electronic health record is the focus of this paper.
The stated anticipated benefits of the National Pro-
gramme for IT are summarised in appendix 1 (on
bmj.com). Previous research into the programme’s
progress in hospital trusts reported findings from 25
interviews with senior NHS staff from four acute
trusts.10 Those interviewees were unanimously and
“unreservedly” supportive of the programme’s goals,
but they highlighted several concerns, including
delayed deployments, local financial deficits, and
poor communication between local managers and the
agency responsible for the programme. Our research
builds on and expands this earlier work by investigat-
ing the NHS Care Records Service in diverse second-
ary care settings and by interviewing a more
comprehensive range of NHS trust staff.
We were commissioned to undertake an indepen-
dent evaluation of early experiences of implementing
the NHS Care Record Service in English hospitals to
inform the subsequent rollout of nationwide electronic
health records. This is, we believe, the largest contem-
poraneous and longitudinal evaluation of an electronic
health record’s implementation ever undertaken.
Here, we report interim findings from five “early adop-
ter” secondary care trusts that have been the focus of
national implementation efforts and where the first
rounds of collection and analysis of evaluation data
are complete. Our primary objectives are to identify
insights and experiences that can usefully shape the
future direction of the NHS Care Records Service in
hospitals at a critical juncture (triggered by a change in
government and recently announced austerity mea-
sures, and plans to restructure the NHS).11 Secondly,
publishing early results fromEngland’s experiences of
implementing an ambitious and expensive IT enabled
transformation of healthcare servicesmay offer lessons
for other countries that are embarking on large scale,
nationwide electronic health record programmes.12
METHODS
Design
We are undertaking a mixed methods, longitudinal,12
socio-technical,13 multisite case study evaluation (see
appendix 2 on bmj.com). Data collection is due to
end in 2011. The evaluation protocol (appendix 3 on
bmj.com) was aligned to the deployment schedule for
the NHS Care Records Service and envisaged a tradi-
tional before-and-after evaluation design. The design
was adapted in response to deployment delays and
the diversity of processes for introducing the new
systems in England’s hospitals, but the evaluation’s
original aims of informing local and national rollout
of electronic health records have been retained. The
adapted approach treats each participating organisa-
tion as an individual case study of the socio-technical
processes of implementing—and, where sufficient pro-
gress has been made, adopting—newly introduced IT
systems for the NHS Care Records Service. While
each case study site is evaluated as a distinct enactment
of the NHS Care Records Service, reviewing findings
from our multiple case studies allows important com-
mon themes to be identified.
Governance and ethics
The research was classed as a service evaluation by the
NHSResearchEthicsCommittee (reference08/H0703/
112). The lead institution is compiling andmaintaining a
record of all data collection activity as themultidisciplin-
ary collaborative team continues to generate a large
longitudinal dataset. Prior informed consent to join the
evaluation was obtained from participating NHS trusts,
and researchers complied with local requirements for
approvals on a case by case basis. Informed consent
was also obtained from participating individuals. We
have protected participants’ anonymity and, as far as
possible, the anonymity of participating sites by remov-
ing identifying information from the data.
Sampling
We used purposive sampling14 to identify 12 diverse
trusts across the areas where the National Programme
for IT is currently being implemented (London;North,
Midlands and East; and Southern England) and to
include sites implementing all three centrally procured
hospital applications (LorenzoandCernerMillennium
for acute hospitals and RiO for mental health). Purpo-
sive sampling was guided by the research aims—to
studyNHS hospital trusts in the process of implement-
ing one of Cerner Millennium, Lorenzo, or RiO and,
within the limited deployments to date, to recruit orga-
nisations with a varied range of geographical settings
and local deployment strategies. Hence, purposive
samplingwas not designed to generate a representative
sample of all secondary care NHS trusts in England
(this would have been inappropriate as most trusts
are not yet implementing the NHS Care Records Ser-
vice). Rather, we sought to recruit as varied as possible
a sample of early adopter sites from which the breadth
and,more importantly, the depth of inquiry could gen-
erate potentially transferable lessons.15-17
No invited NHS trust refused to participate in the
evaluation. We decided not to pursue evaluation
work at one trust where there were access difficulties
after initial recruitment. Lack of engagement, which
would severely compromise data collection, seemed
to be the result of competing priorities for trust staff at
a time of organisational change.
Within each of the remaining case studies, purposive
sampling aimed to recruit a diverse range of inter-
viewees with a stake in implementation of the NHS
Care Records Service, actively seeking different
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perspectives, including outlier views. Trust inter-
viewees in the five case studies reported here were hos-
pital managers, members of the implementation team
and IT staff, doctors, nurses, allied health profes-
sionals, administrative staff, and, where appropriate,
patients and carers (table 1). In addition, we purpo-
sively sampled knowledgeable individuals who were
notNHS trust staff andwhooffered additional perspec-
tives on implementing theNHSCare Records Service.
Interviewees came from NHS Connecting For Health
(part of theDepartment of Health Informatics Directo-
rate and responsible for overseeing the National Pro-
gramme for IT), strategic health authorities (the
regional NHS management organisations responsible
for local delivery of the programme), local service pro-
viders (contracted to deploy the NHS Care Records
Service in secondary care), and the commercial com-
panies subcontracted to supply the applications.
Settings
The reported research is set in five diverse secondary
careNHShospital trusts inEngland.These includeone
site implementing Cerner Millennium and one site
implementingRiO, for which British Telecommunica-
tions is the local service provider contracted to deliver
London services, and three sites implementing Lor-
enzo in the North, Midlands and East region, where
the local service provider is Computer Science Cor-
poration (figure). Anonymised information about the
trusts is given in table 1.
Data collection
Qualitative data collected at each case study site con-
sisted of trust documents, transcripts of semi-struc-
tured interviews (conducted face-to-face, by
telephone, and by email), and on-site observations
and accompanying field notes (table 1). We also
reviewed specialist IT publications, national media
reports, and publications by parliamentary and profes-
sional bodies to track the wider context (macro-envir-
onment) in which implementations took place.
We collected public NHS trust documents and, with
permission, private ones. Documents collected from
the trustswere copies of the trusts’ organisational struc-
ture, deployment timelines for the NHS Care Records
Service, project initiation documents, business cases,
risk registers, minutes from board meetings related to
the NHS Care Records Service, “lessons learned”
documents, training strategy documents, and annual
reports. Additional relevant local documents, such as
Table 1 | Characteristics of the five NHS acute hospital and mental health trusts implementing NHS Care Records Service applications for which interim data
collection and analysis are complete
Case study identifier and
description
Application, supplier,
local service provider Application’s deployment status and plans Interim data sources
Site A: acute NHS hospital trust,
London area (urban)
Cerner Millennium,
Cerner, BT
Due to deploy clinical functionality (such as test requests and
results) in May 2010; patient administration system in 2011;
plans to build on clinical functionality over 5 years. Trust-wide
deployment
26 interviews: 17 trust staff (3 IT, 5 implementation team, 7
clinical, 2 administrative); 5 patients or carers; 2 strategic
health authority staff (LPfIT); 2 local service provider staff.
Attendance at trust’s NHS Care Records Service board
meetings. Trust documents; public body and press reports;
field notes. All but 4 interviews audio recorded and
transcribed (2 patients and 2 healthcare staff declined to
be recorded, and interviewer took contemporaneous
notes). Data collection March-October 2009
Site B: NHS foundation trust, North,
Midlands and East area
(predominantly rural)
Lorenzo (release 1),
iSoft, CSC
Small scale implementation as an order communication
system (ordering requests and results); plans to deploy
release 1.9 patient administration system trust-wide
45 interviews: 35 trust staff (13 implementation team, 18
clinical, 4 administrative); 6 patients; 2 local service
provider staff; 2 NHS Connecting for Health staff. Trust
documents; press reports; field notes. All but 2 interviews
audio recorded and transcribed (1 nurse declined to be
recorded and in 1 interview the recorder failed, and
interviewer took contemporaneous notes). Data collection
February-October 2009
Site C: NHS foundation trust, North,
MidlandsandEastarea (mixedurban
and surrounding communities)
Lorenzo (release 1),
iSoft, CSC
Small scale implementation in one department as an order
communication system (ordering requests and results); due
to digitalise requesting and reporting processes and make
some related clinical processes “paper-light”; due to deploy
clinical documentation project department-wide. Plans to
have, in effect, three go-lives in one project
6 interviews with trust staff (4 implementation team, 2
clinical). Trust documents; field notes. Interviews audio
recorded and transcribed. Data collection June 2009
Site H: NHS foundation trust, North,
Midlands and East area (urban)
Lorenzo (release 1),
iSoft, CSC
Small scale implementation of clinical documentation
functionality. Plans to roll out functionality toother specialties
before considering trust-wide roll out
13 interviews with trust staff (6 implementation team, 7
clinical). Trust documents; press reports; field notes.
Interviews audio recorded and transcribed. Data collection
July 2009 to February 2010
Site M: NHS foundation trust and
integrated mental health and social
care trust, London area (urban)
RiO (5.1), CSE Healthcare
Systems, BT
Trust-wide deployment completed in mid-2009, except for
prescription, which it is planned to deploy mid-2010
24 interviews: 20 trust staff (10 implementation team, 10
clinical); 3 LPfIT staff; 1 local service provider staff).
Attendance at Trust’s NHS Care Records Service board
meetings. Trust documents; public body and press reports;
on site observations; field notes. All interviews audio
recorded and transcribed except 1 (at interviewee’s
request, contemporaneous interviewer notes) and 1 email
interview (at interviewee’s request). Data collection May-
November 2009
LPfIT=London Programme for IT.
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work process maps, were collected where these were
accessible. Trust documents provided the local context
for each case study and complemented other data
sources by, for example, allowing comparison of their
contents with national policy statements and with data
gathered in interviews with trust staff.
Interviews, lasting on average an hour, explored
individuals’ expectations, experiences, and opinions
of electronic health records. The interviewers were
five university employees (KC, AT, DP, SC, and
AR), all experienced qualitative researchers with no
prior relationships with the interviewees. Early inter-
views were guided by topic guides (see appendix 4)
designed for specific interviewee groups. As each
case study progressed, the lead researcher at that site
adapted interview guides and other data collection to
respond to previously collected data and emerging
themes. Nearly all interviews were audio-recorded
(table 1). For a few interviews, participants requested
not to be recorded, and in such instances the researcher
took notes. Professional transcribers transcribed the
interviews verbatim, with the interviewers then
checking the transcripts for accuracy. Copies of the
transcripts were available to interviewees, although
only a minority requested to see them; there were
no cases of interviewees disputing the transcript
contents.
Data collection finished at each of the study sites
when the research team judged that saturation had
been achieved—that is, when no new, rich, diverse
data relevant to the evaluation were being acquired.
This was partly influenced by factors related to the set-
ting—such as the scale of the deployment at the site (for
example, limited to a ward or hospital-wide) and type
of functionalities being introduced (for example,
ordering of tests or clinical notes). The individual
data collection periods varied by site (table 1); all of
the data reported here were collected between Febru-
ary 2009 andFebruary2010.Wewill revisit each site to
collect longitudinal data in order to understand how
implementation progresses.
Data analysis
Qualitative data collection and analysis were iterative.
Researchers combined top-down, thematic coding that
was guided by a matrix of socio-technical factors13 and
bottom-up, inductive coding that allowed themes to
emerge from the data without prior theoretical
categorisation.15-17 From a socio-technical perspective,
organisational and human (socio) factors and IT sys-
tem factors (technical) are interrelated parts of one sys-
tem, each shaping the other.18 Information about the
socio-technical approach that provides the theoretical
underpinning for the evaluation is given in appendix 5
on bmj.com.
The software package NVivo 8 was used to manage
interviews, field notes, and documentary data. Data
coding was undertaken by the researchers who col-
lected the data. In keeping with an interpretative qua-
litative approach, which recognises the subjectivity of
the researcher,16 17 we used a range of approaches to
validate data quality and credibility, including check-
ing for face validity, looking for disconfirming evi-
dence, data triangulation by data source, and seeking
informant feedback. Emerging findings were shared
with participating trusts for feedback. Transcripts,
codes, emerging findings, and their interpretations
were presented and discussed by research colleagues
at each stage of the analysis in regular team meetings
and in multidisciplinary data analysis workshops and
steering group meetings. Discussions and feedback
supported researcher reflexivity and confirmed the
interim results’ trustworthiness and credibility.19
RESULTS
Several themes echoed those previously reported in
the electronic health record implementation literature
(see box).20 Rather than explore these further, in this
paper we focus on themes from the macro-environ-
ment and cross-cutting themes that are particularly
relevant to English health policy and national and
international debates about approaches to implement-
ing electronic health records. The key themes are
 How the envisioned NHS Care Records Service
in England has evolved substantially since its
launch
 Hospital staff want electronic health records, but
the type of electronic health record and scale of
data sharing that are wanted are far less clear
 Increasing uncertainties about the future of the
current NHS Care Records Service Programme
 Perceived multiple adverse consequences of
centrally negotiated contracts to deliver
nationwide electronic health records
 Trusts wanting systems that are better tailored to
their particular organisation, not standardised
systems
 Community level implementations of electronic
health records and data sharing may present the
optimal way forward.
A selection of supporting data is given to illustrate
each theme.
Southern area
No local service provider
(BT provides support to some trusts*)
London area
BT
North, Midlands, and
Eastern area
CSC
Suppliers
Local service providers
Applications
Lorenzo RiO
* BT took over eight trusts with Cerner Millennium from former Southern local service provider, Fujitsu, and has a new
   contract for four acute and 25 RiO sites
Cerner
Millennium
RiO Cerner
Millennium
Various
iSoft CSE Healthcare
Systems
Cerner CSE Healthcare
Systems
Cerner Other suppliers
approved
by NHS
Connecting
for Health
The NHS Care Records Service in secondary care in 2010: local service providers, local service
provider suppliers, and NHS Care Records Service applications.
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The macro-environment: the evolving nature of the NHS
Care Records Service
Despite recognised successes in delivering compo-
nents of the overall programme—for instance, introdu-
cing a fast NHS broadband network (N3) and picture
archiving and communications systems in all hospitals
—theNational Programme for IT has struggled to deli-
ver the NHS Care Records Service as originally envi-
sioned in the planned timescale. Consequently, it has
attracted negative media coverage and critical
questioning by parliamentary bodies charged with
scrutinising government spending. Table 2 gives a
timeline of programme developments, including
some key parliamentary and independent reports pub-
lished in the course of the programme.
Major adjustments to the NHS Care Records Ser-
vice include departures of two local service providers,
repeatedly re-negotiated central contracts, changes to
NHS Connecting for Health’s staff and governance
structures, delays with software, and adjustments to
the delivery model—and, in part as a consequence of
these, rollout delays. Further, since 2004, over half of
England’s NHS trusts have become autonomousNHS
organisations (that is, foundation trusts)34 and some are
now choosing to implement their own choice of elec-
tronic health record solutions independently of NHS
Connecting for Health.
Hence, the envisioned approach to implementing
the NHS Care Records Service in hospitals—deliver-
ing standardised applications with phased introduc-
tions of integrated clinical functionalities—has
changed. It has evolved into various IT systems related
to the NHS Care Records Service—such as patient
administration systems, tests ordering, pathology
reporting, e-prescribing, and maternity systems—
being implemented differently in different hospital
trusts. This is a more service based model of deploy-
ment, echoing the “Clinical 5” systems identified in the
2008 Health Informatics Review.28 It may also be seen to
represent a shift from an electronic health record con-
ceptualised as a database of pooled information to an
electronic health record as a system to coordinate
diverse transactions between clinicians and various
specialist services. Deployments of IT systems related
to the NHS Care Records Service to date range from
small scale, extended “soft launches” of a local service
provider application that is still under development to
trust-wide “big bang”deployments ofmore established
applications. The implementation area boundaries for
the two local service providers that retained their con-
tracts have become less clear.
Hospitals still want electronic health records—but what
kind?
Concordant with earlier research,10 our data indicated
that electronic health records were still strongly sup-
ported bymost interviewees despite frequent accounts
of multiple frustrations with the programme to deliver
the NHS Care Records Service. Many NHS clinicians
supported electronic health records. A distinctionmay
be drawn between the enthusiasm clinicians expressed
for imagined, ideal electronic health record systems
and the more mixed perceptions of those starting to
use current NHS Care Records Service applications.
Further, clinicians’ enthusiasm for electronic health
records often related to perceived benefits in their
immediate surroundings and did not necessarily relate
to the NHS Care Records Service goal of geographi-
cally widespread sharing of patient data.
Main themes from interviews with staff implementing three NHS Care Records Service
applications at five case study sites
Organisational dimension
 Organisational context
 Getting the organisation ready for change
 Infrastructure
 Planning
 Leadership and management
 Trust resources
 Teamwork and communication
 Learning and evaluation
 Sharing lessons learned
 Perceived risks and benefits of implementing application
 Realistic expectations and timelines
Social or human dimension
 NHS Care Records Service vision(s)
 Needs of stakeholders and perceived benefits
 Interactions between stakeholder groups
 Attitudes, expectations, concerns, and motivations
 Champions
 Integration of system with existing work processes
 Ownership and resistance
 Workarounds
 End user input into design
 User engagement
 Patients’ views
 IT literacy in NHS
 Training to use new application
 Support for users
 Realistic expectations and timelines
Technical dimension
 Data cleansing and migration
 Features and functionalities of application
 Adaptability and flexibility of new system (customisability)
 Integration with existing systems
 Stability
 System benefits
 Usability and performance—software
 Usability and performance—hardware
 Data security and confidentiality
 Smartcard log-in
 Legitimate relationships and “role based access”
RESEARCH
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“I think, ultimately, it’s a major win-win; it will be
fantastic if it works, and the sooner the better as far
as I’m concerned because patients’ notes,
everything that hangs round patients’ notes and
appointments, work scheduling, prescribing,
ordering tests, is just so clumsy in a paper world.”—
doctor, site B.
“It’s actually speeding things up, and it’s more
reliable about information. It’s live information.”—
community nurse, site M.
This support for the concept of electronic health
records was often tempered by early experiences of
using newly introduced NHS Care Records Service
applications.
“I was going into all the right fields quite quickly,
but the time it took the computer programme to
move through the fields was much greater than the
time it took me to input the information, such that it
took me at least 20 minutes to do this; and I could
have done the paper exercise on the forms we
already had, I would think, in 10 or less.”—
consultant, site B.
“I think there will also be some workload
implications, because I see people at home, so I’m
not going to have access to anything in the patient’s
home. I’m inevitably going to have to keep some
things on paper.”—consultant, site M.
The goal of access to patients’ electronic health
records from other parts of the country was described
as an expensive and problematic solution to a non-
existent clinical problem by the single clinician who
expressed adamant opposition to the NHS Care
Records Service (although he supported the use of
healthcare IT generally).
“… apart from our ability as a nation to count,
there’s no strategic advantage in being able to know
the records of somebody in Newcastle in London
because there’s very little mobility that causes
problems for patients.”—consultant, site A.
Others, however, highlighted both local and
national data sharing as important aspects of electronic
health records.
“I think there is a huge amount of benefit for this to
be truly developed as a patient care record whereby
Table 2 | Timeline showing some key developments in the NHS National Programme for IT (NPfIT) in England and some key publications
Date Developments in NPfIT Key publications on the NHS or NPfIT
1998 NHS Executive commits to detailed electronic health records NHS Executive. Information for Health: an Information Strategy for the
Modern NHS 1998-2005.21
2002 NPfIT starts
Richard Granger appointed NHS IT director
House of Commons Library. NHS funding and reform: the Wanless Report.22
Department of Health. Delivering 21st Century IT Support for the NHS:
National Strategic Programme.6
2003 BT awarded contract for the national data Spine
Local service provider 10 year contracts awarded (CSC for North West and West Midland
cluster; BT Capital Care Alliance for London cluster; Fujitsu for Southern cluster; Accenture
for North East and Eastern England clusters)
2004 BT awarded N3 (NHS broadband network) contract Royal Academy of Engineering, British Computer Society. The Challenges of
Complex IT Projects.23
2005 NHS Connecting for Health (NHS CFH) set up to deliver NPfIT
Contract reset 1 (BT) for “interim solutions” in London
2006 Accenture withdraws as local service provider; CSC awarded 9 year contract for Accenture’s
former clusters
British Computer Society. The Way Forward for NHS Health Informatics.24
National Audit Office.Department of Health: TheNational Programme for IT in
the NHS.25
2007 NPfIT Local Ownership Programme (devolves responsibility for local delivery of the
programme from NHS CFH to groupings of strategic health authorities; replaces original five
clusters with three programme areas: Southern (local service provider Fujitsu), London (local
service provider BT) and North, Midlands and East (local service provider CSC)
Contract reset 2 (BT) for “best of breed” London solutions
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts. Department of Health:
The National Programme for IT in the NHS.26
2008 Fujitsu contract for local service provider in Southern area terminated, legal dispute
continues
Contract reset negotiations 3 (BT) for new delivery model in London
Richard Granger, head of NHS CFH, leaves in January; Gordon Hextall, acting head, leaves in
April; Christine Connelly and Martin Bellamy appointed to jointly lead NHS CFH in September
National Audit Office. The National Programme for IT in the NHS: Progress
since 2006.5
Department of Health. High quality care for all: NHS Next Stage Review final
report.27
Department of Health. Health Informatics Review: Report.28
2009 BT awarded additional contract to take over eight trusts formerly with Fujitsu (seven after
merger of two trusts), plus 25 trusts for RiO and four additional acute trusts in Southern area
Other Southern trusts given choice of local service provider solution from BT or CSC or from
various suppliers in Additional Supply Capability and Capacity List (ASCC)
Martin Bellamy, director of programmes and systems delivery, NHS CFH, resigns
NHS CFH, headed by Christine Connelly, is integrated with Department of Health Informatics
Directorate
November deadline for new deployment of Cerner Millennium across an additional acute
trust in London area (met)
Parliamentary announcement of contract renegotiations with BT and CSC—seeking NPfIT
cost savings
Royal College of General Practitioners. Informing shared clinical care: Final
report of the Shared Record Professional Guidance project.29
Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust. Database State.30
Independent Review of NHS and Social Care IT.31 (commissioned by
Conservative Party)
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee. TheNational Programme for
IT in the NHS: Progress since 2006.32
2010 March deadline for deployment of Lorenzo across an acute trust in North, Midlands and East
area (not met)
New memorandum of agreement signed between BT and NHS CFH, including reduced
number of deployments in acute trusts in London; contract discussions with CSC continuing
May: UK general election—new coalition government
Cruickshank J. Fixing NHS IT: A plan of action for a new government.33
Department of Health. Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS.11
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all disciplines, everyone who is in contact with the
patient, records things in one place.”—
implementation manager, site B.
“It would be helpful to have a national system so
you would get people that have come down, maybe,
from Manchester or Liverpool or wherever because
there is the big train station here and people get
picked up by the police and brought in and they are
disturbed and can’t really give a history. It would be
really helpful to be able to access notes nationally
and not just within an organisation”—doctor, site M.
Uncertainties about the future of the programme are
intensifying
Perceived uncertainties about the programme’s future
intensified in advance of the UK general election.
Respondents repeatedly raised the possibility of radi-
cal changes. They referred to statements from political
parties in favour of dismantling the programme, to
organisational and senior staff changes in the pro-
gramme, to the history of deployment delays, and to
the UK economic recession and related anticipated
curbs on NHS spending. Both NHS trust interviewees
and local service providers expressed fears that pro-
gress in developing the central NHS IT infrastructure
and shared detailed electronic health records could be
lost, with a considerable waste of public money and
effort already expended.
“I have my doubts as to the future. Not least
because of the political environment. There is a
huge amount of work to get it into an acceptable
state, where people will be screaming to come and
buy it. If you want to sell something, the best way to
sell something is if someone wants to buy it.”—
consultant, site B.
“I’m just wondering how does that work [if a new
government scraps the programme] and what a
horrendous waste of money that would be, you
know, and if there’s any way of getting that message
home to a few people, because I do realise it is a
very political thing, but it would be such a crime, it
would really be terrible.”—IT manager, site H.
“We’re just, um, deeply worried that we’ll miss the
boat because the plug may be pulled because of
other political and financial pressures.”—local
service provider A, interviewee 2.
Centrally negotiated contacts and the “ruthless stan-
dardisation” described in the Department of Health’s
2002 national strategy were designed in part to contain
programme costs.6 The top-down approachwas also in
part a response to the perceived history of slow and
uneven development of NHS IT systems before the
programme.21 A major perceived risk now was a pos-
sible radical swing back to a “bottom-up” approach
that would leave responsibility for NHS IT develop-
ments with individual trusts and at best aspires to link
multiple local systems using interoperability stan-
dards. Although a few interviewees perceived benefits
in the local choice and sense of ownership that a bot-
tom-up approach would bring, others believed it
currently impossible to integrate disparate systems
and that attempting to do so would set back electronic
health records by many years.
Any detailed electronic health record resulting from
a “bottom-up” approach would not be a single, shared
electronic health record.
“Standards and interoperability—what does that
mean? Where am I going to get my view of the
patient? I am never going to be able to see my view
of the patient because there’s going to be 30% here,
20 over there, 50 over there. Where’s going to hold
the 100% of the data that I need to see my
patient?”—local service provider A, interviewee 2.
Some NHS interviewees were determined to carry
on with implementing electronic health records,
despite deployment delays and programme uncertain-
ties, as both the potential risks and potential benefits of
introducing electronic health records had become
clearer.
“Now the way in which that gets delivered, I mean
at the moment as far as the trust is concerned, this
particular organisation will carry on, and I have the
full intention of getting something deployed. I will
stay until I finish. I’m absolutely determined.”—
implementation team, site A.
Interviewees identify multiple adverse consequences of
centrally negotiated contracts
NHS Connecting for Health devolved responsibility
for delivering the programme locally to groupings of
strategic health authorities in 2007but retained respon-
sibility for the central contracts. Local service provi-
ders have responsibility for their own subcontracts
with systems suppliers. The “customers” for the NHS
Care Records Service—the hospital trusts—have no
direct contractual relation with NHS Connecting for
Health, the local service providers, or the suppliers of
the NHS Care Records Service applications.
The difficulties arising from this arrangement were
evident fromNHS interviewees repeatedly speaking of
convoluted communication channels and, particu-
larly, frustratingly slow response times to deal with
requests for software fixes or changes.
“But what has to happen is it goes to this group to
be approved, and then that group to be approved,
and it goes all the way round the houses, and then
eventually it gets to the developer, and they say,
‘Well, it hasn’t been scheduled for a build so I can’t
touch this yet.’ So then they’ve got to schedule it for
a build, but they say we’re fixed for the next three
builds, and they’re monthly, so that then brings
another three month delay to it all.”—IT manager,
site H.
“In practice, what it means is that something goes
wrong, the IT people say it’s the [supplier] people,
the [supplier] people say it’s the [local service
provider] people, [local service provider] people say
it’s your trust. Actually, it makes things a bit difficult
because people are passing the buck a bit.”—doctor,
site M.
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“[Local service providers], with the best will in the
world, are only ever going to fulfil the contract;
they’re in business. They are, in some areas,
beginning to kind of loosen up and understand that,
actually, the success is only going to follow a much
more integrated style of working with the NHS.”—
IT staff, site B.
With contracts structured such that local service pro-
viders are paid after deployment of applications to hos-
pital trusts, delays in rollout also had amajor impact on
local service provider finances. Local service providers
described their contracts as “punitive” and driving the
wrong behaviours—the second point was also endo-
rsed by some trust staff.
“We have to move out of that culture of responding
to national pressure or the Parliamentary Accounts
Committee setting six month targets because that
drives all the wrong behaviour. We have to be more
outcome driven rather than, you know, date and
milestone driven.”—local service provider B,
interviewee 2.
“I don’t know how the contracts are written … but
what it looks like from a ground-upwards
perspective is that it’s written in such a way that
[local service provider] don’t actually have to worry
about the quality they’re delivering and whether it
actually works; they just, all they have to do is to
just basically just get bodies on the floor.”—IT
manager, site H.
Planned deployment schedules were widely viewed
as politically and contractually driven and described
by some interviewees as “unrealistic” and as “ludi-
crous” from the outset. Premature deployments had
negative consequences for users’ perceptions of local
service provider solutions, for instance,where the tech-
nology itself was not deemed ready by users (such as
“clunky,” slow to use, unreliable, withminimal clinical
functionality) orwhere therewere publicised reports of
trusts struggling with adverse consequences after
deployment or upgrade of an NHS Care Records Ser-
vice system.
“… to me it’s a very immature product… they need
to take it away for six months and work with some
clinicians and then bring it back.”—manager, site C.
“The issues at [hospital trust] were very big, and I
think what tends to happen is, it’s not the reality
ever that counts, sadly, it’s people’s perceptions,
and the perception by clinicians is that it’s all [the
application’s] fault.”—implementation team, site A.
Local service providers’ solutions were also viewed
by users as technologically unsophisticated, in some
cases less good than the healthcare IT systems they
had replaced.
“It’s a disappointment to have a clinical tool that is
not as advanced as what I can do when I go and do
my internet shopping for my weekly shop.”—
clinician, site M.
“I think the information system that we had before
was possibly better.”—clinician 2, site M.
Furthermore, specifications written into long term
contracts did not keep pace with technological
advances.
“The current log-on method that people have is
these ‘smartcards.’ It’s like antiquated technology.
It’s a card that goes in a hole. What infection risk is
that, for starters? … I mean, it should be something
that’s proximity, wireless.”—local service provider
B, interviewee 2.
Trusts want systems that are tailored to their particular
organisation, not standardised systems
Trusts wanted greater control over the NHS Care
Records Service; they had strongly perceived needs
for the standard solutions to be tailored to individual
NHS trusts, which saw themselves as diverse and com-
plex organisations. NHS interviewees sought systems
that were quickly responsive to changing central and
local NHS priorities, hence able to support a trust’s
business requirements, capable of local adaptation to
suit individual trust’s varied processes and work prac-
tices, quick and reliable for staff to use, and offering
early clear benefit to clinicians.
“I understand they’re trying to put in a national
product, but I think, you know, at the end of the
day, does one size fit all? I’m afraid it doesn’t.”—
administration director, site H.
Local service providers acknowledged difficulties
from the outset arising from trying to implement
inflexible standardised applications.
“It was set up almost guaranteed to run into the
problems that have subsequently been experienced
in that the standardised model as conceived by the
centre was not what the end users were looking
for.”—local service provider B, interviewee 1.
“So it’s just disconnected … Obviously we need the
NHS to tell us what the priorities are. And I think if
we remain in a place where Connecting for Health
tell us what those priorities are, we’re always going
to be disconnected.”—local service provider B,
interviewee 2.
Locally configuring the local service provider solu-
tions could cost substantially more than deploying
standard local service provider applications in each
trust—50% more per deployment according to one
interviewee (local service provider A, interviewee 1).
The extent to which the need for local tailoring was
more perceived than real was questioned by another
local service provider interviewee (formerly an NHS
clinician), who suggested the primary need was for
NHS organisations to agree on greater standardisation
of clinical practices.
“If you have what I call a customer focus, turn it on
its head and do it correctly for the patient, and
standardise on clinical practice, the rest should
follow.”—local service provider A, interviewee 2.
Low levels of IT skills in NHS trusts, trusts’ lack of
resources for IT infrastructure and for staff training,
and, more widely, a perceived lack of fundamental
understanding that the aimof theNational Programme
RESEARCH
page 8 of 12 BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.com
for IT is to transform healthcare organisation and care
delivery were also highlighted by a diverse range of
interviewees as important barriers to deployment of
electronic health records.
Community level approaches to deployment of electronic
health records and data sharing may be the optimal way
forward
Focusing on the successful sharing of detailed electro-
nic health records at the smaller-scale level of naturally
occurring, local health communities was widely per-
ceived to offer the “biggest bang for buck” (local ser-
vice provider A, interviewee 1). A local health
community would not conform to a specified geogra-
phical area, rather it might consist of one or more,
neighbouring hospital trusts with primary care provi-
ders and associated local community, pharmacy, and
mental health services.
“More than 90% of health care is delivered within
that thing [local health community]. Now, of course,
people get referred out to [specialist children’s
hospital] from wherever, but that’s actually
relatively rare.”—local service provider A,
interviewee 1.
In England, hospitals’ services are commissioned by
primary care trusts. NHS interviewees thus often per-
ceived neighbouring hospital trusts to be local rivals
that competed for business, yet there were also sugges-
tions for future cooperation and resource sharing
between NHS organisations implementing the same
NHS Care Records Service application, for instance,
by placing staff in each others’ trusts.
“What would be useful would be for some of our
guys, yeah, basically to do role swaps. I mean, in an
ideal world that’s what you’d want to do, you’d
want to be able to send some of your staff—whether
they be doctors, nurses, physios, porters, whoever—
to do role swaps.”—implementation manager, site
A.
“So I think one of the lessons the NHS has to learn
is it needs to drive an economy of scale through
bringing together of existing capabilities within
organisations into a bigger, shared service across
those organisations.”—IT staff, site B.
The need for leadership to realise community level
cooperation was highlighted.
“I think we have a problem because there’s a lack of
trust between the trusts, so there seems to be a lot of
suspicion because of the new arrangements with the
sort of commissioning provider stuff. I think there’s
a little bit of, what’s the word, distrust, you know …
If there was better leadership it would work well,
but at the moment we’re kind of treading water, you
know, sinking, because the leadership is not there,
which is disappointing.”—IT staff, site H.
For someLondon interviewees, includingNHS staff,
the proposed model of cooperation between trusts
reflected prior, personal experience of such resource
sharing when, before the National Programme for IT
started, three local NHS trusts had cooperated to
deploy the same IT system sequentially in their orga-
nisations.
“For the first deployment, the final two trusts had
staff project managers and staff working in the first,
and then the first helped out the second, and then
the third. In 18 months we achieved what it now
takes about five years to do, because of that
process.”—local service provider A, interviewee 2.
DISCUSSION
Summary of main findings
These interim findings show that the initial, top-down
policy of standardised NHS Care Records Service
applications in secondary care in England has, for a
range of reasons, had to evolve into an approach that
is more responsive to the circumstances and expressed
wishes of individual hospital trusts. Although the ori-
ginal plan has faltered, foundations for detailed electro-
nic health records are emerging as the approach
continues to adapt to permit more local choice and as
NHS staff and other stakeholders gain greater insight
into both the risks and promise of electronic health
records. Deployment delays to date were often attrib-
uted to an unrealistic, politically driven timeline from
the outset. Multiple tensions between a central pro-
gramme and the local NHS “customers,” convoluted
communication lines, and NHS trusts’ lack of capacity
and readiness for IT enabled change all contributed to
delays.
The future of the National Programme for IT is still
uncertain in light of the new coalition government tak-
ing office and forthcoming cuts in public spending.
Some fear that policy makers might now swing from
the initial top-down approach to the opposite, a bot-
tom-up approach, whereas the more desirable
approach suggested by several interviewees is a hybrid
of the two, recognising a place for both central and
local responsibilities and with efforts at sharing
detailed electronic health records focused on local
health communities. Our interviewees’ accounts are
concordant with the fundamentally socio-technical
character of electronic health records and the need to
allow the mutual alignment of the technology and the
people who work with it.35 36
Strengths and limitations of this work
Weare evaluating aphenomenon that is still unfolding,
and the prospective, longitudinal design should allow
us to discriminate between transitory and more sus-
tained consequences of implementation and adoption
of electronic health records. Accessing a wide range of
stakeholder perspectives and multiple data sources
illuminates changing, multifaceted, socio-technical
processes—and is strengthened by purposive sampling
of early adopter sites and theoretically informed data
collection and analysis. Previous qualitative work has
focused on a single group of senior NHS
professionals,10 whereas we are accessing the views
and experiences of many groups inside and outside
the case study trusts, including, importantly, the users
RESEARCH
BMJ | ONLINE FIRST | bmj.com page 9 of 12
of the new systems. The comprehensive approach
should enhance the transferability of our findings and
conclusions.
Data collection, coding, and analysis at each case
study site were primarily carried out by a single
researcher, which allowed the lead researcher to
develop familiarisation with that site and a rich under-
standing of its dataset. This approach, combined with
transparency and checking at each stage of data collec-
tion, coding, and analysis with the wider research team
and beyond, ensured findings were grounded in the
data.
We were unable to access confidential local service
provider contracts. Partly as a result of this, it has
proved challenging to gain a holistic understanding of
the overall National Programme for IT. Other bodies
reviewing the programme, such as the House of Com-
mons Public Accounts Committee have experienced
similar challenges in accessing sensitive commercial
information.26 32
Our interim findings are based on the first round of
data collection from five sites at the forefront of imple-
mentation efforts, sampling diverse NHS organisa-
tions and all three hospital applications of the NHS
Care Records Service. When data collection and ana-
lysis are complete, we will be able to compare longitu-
dinal experiences of implementing these applications
in a wider range of local contexts, reporting from
11 secondary care settings. Preliminary data from the
additional six sites, not yet reported, strongly support
our key interim themes, suggesting high transferability
to other early adopter sites. Early adopters may differ
in important ways from NHS trusts that will join the
NHS Care Records Service programme later or not
at all. While the five trusts reported here are likely to
be representative of early adopters, we acknowledge
they may not be representative of all secondary care
trusts in England.
More generally, the optimal timing for publishing
results of policy-focused evaluations must strike a bal-
ance between providing early formative feedback that
can usefully shape policy development and providing
later feedback that is strengthened by increased evi-
dence but is reported too late to influence policy direc-
tion. Our evaluation is likely to end before new
applications and new ways of working have reached
stability, at which time further positive and negative
consequences of electronic health records may
emerge.
Considering these findings in an international context
The current literature is dominated by reports of single
organisations’ implementations of, often home-grown,
electronic health records,37 but countries such as the
United States and Australia are now embarking on
nationwide initiatives.38 39 Such nationwide health
information and communication initiatives and their
consequences—particularly with respect to data
exchange—are new terrain.3 40 England, the United
States, and Australia are starting with quite different
health services. They are also taking different
approaches to achieving nationwide electronic health
records, which have been categorised as “bottom-up”
(US), “middle-out” (Australia), and “top-down”
(England).41
A bottom-up approachmight preserve existing local
systems and exploit the emergence of interoperability
standards in order to exchange healthcare information
and support the patient journey. In contrast, a top-
down approach is centrally directed and replaces exist-
ing, diverse local systems with the aim of creating and
storing a single, sharable electronic health record. A
middle-out approach combines central support for
national goals and common standards with incentives
to encourage incremental compliance with standards
at the local level.41 TheUS government offers financial
incentives for “meaningful use” of accredited systems,
and regional data exchanges are planned.42 43 Hence,
local level choice is more constrained than the term
“bottom-up” might suggest. In England, the partial
migration from a top-down approach towards a mid-
dle-out approach reflects the interplay of dynamic and
complex interactions in the course of theNational Pro-
gramme for IT. Arguably, both theUS and the English
approach are nowmore closely alignedwith eachother
andwith that ofAustralia, all as variations of a “middle-
out” approach. A major uncertainty remains about
how well these approaches will achieve meaningful
data exchange that supports patient care, which will
in part depend on the balance between local level free-
doms and constraints.
Policy implications
Major policy revisions affecting the National Pro-
gramme for IT are anticipated after the recent election
of a new coalition government and announcements of
widespread cuts to public spending to address the UK
national deficit. Even small policy adjustments that are
based on early evidence from evaluations can substan-
tially influence developments in a programme as large,
complex, and ambitious as introducing nationwide
electronic health records. For example, interim results
from the evaluation of the summary care record are
believed to have played an important role in influen-
cing revisions to the consent model.8
The health service in England ismade up of a variety
of diverse NHS organisations, some with considerable
autonomy as NHS foundation trusts. There is also a
degree of competition between local hospital trusts
that tender to provide services to primary care com-
missioners. Our data highlight an inherent tension
between government policies that have encouraged
decentralisation of NHS control44 and a policy to sup-
ply centrally procured, standardised IT systems to
local NHS settings. A further policy tension was evi-
dent in writing systems requirements into long term
contracts forNHS IT applicationswhile national direc-
tives for service delivery and reporting by NHS trusts
continually change. Similarly, technologies change,
which can quickly result in long term contracts becom-
ing technologically outdated.
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We offer four policy related recommendations
based on our interim findings. Firstly, it would be
immediately helpful if theDepartment ofHealth expli-
citly acknowledged inconsistencies between, on the
one hand, promoting NHS internal markets and foun-
dations trusts and, on the other, the inflexibility of long
term, centrally negotiated contracts that exclude the
NHS trust “customer.” Secondary care trusts may
struggle to implement electronic health records for
many reasons; consistency in the leadership from the
Department of Health combined with clear informa-
tion about the future of the National Programme for
IT could help alleviate some current difficulties. Sec-
ondly, it is evident that NHS trusts need to be allowed
to communicate changing local and national NHS
priorities directly to those workingwith them to imple-
ment electronic health records, whether this is
achieved by unfettered lines of communication
between the trust and its local service provider or
between the trust and the application supplier. Thirdly,
linking local service provider payments to “bodies on
the floor” (the numbers of sites deploying in accor-
dance with a set schedule of dates) was a strategy for
controlling the cost of central contracts that is creating
problems. Linking contract payments to more
thoughtfully agreed outcomes could potentially con-
trol costs and benefit bothNHS trusts striving to imple-
ment and local service providers striving to deploy.
NHS trustsmay be strongly encouraged to take local
service provider solutions but they cannot be forced to
do so. To date, some have bargained for greater influ-
ence over system choice, design, delivery, and local
configuration. Simultaneously, local service providers
have repeatedly negotiated with trusts, with their sup-
pliers, and with NHS Connecting For Health to re-set
the contracts. Public discourse tends to focus on the IT
programme’s troubled history, whereas the greater
need is to debate the desired outcome of electronic
health records in the light of the identified policy
tensions andprogrammechanges.Consideringnation-
wide implementations of electronic health records
with the aid of broad categories such as a “middle-
out” versus a “top-down” approach is useful but lim-
ited. In England, debates about other important
dimensions—such as what kind of detailed electronic
health record is wanted, on what scale, and howmuch
the country is prepared to pay for it—are still far from
settled. Our fourth recommendation, therefore, is that
clearly answering these more fundamental questions
should be policy makers’ first priority.
Conclusions
The English experience indicates that a “vision” of
introducing nationwide electronic health records in
the context of a broader aim to improvenational health
care can successfully kick-start an ambitious pro-
gramme of IT based transformation. Realising the
vision, however, is likely to be an incremental and
iterative process that unfolds over many years. Such a
timescale emphasises the need for flexibility and local
adaptability, both in the electronic health record sys-
tems and in how they are delivered to accommodate
technological developments and changing local and
national priorities. Public debates pitting centrally dri-
ven, standardised systems versus common standards
and interoperability might more usefully be reframed
as a debate about exactly what kind of a nationwide
electronic health record is now needed and affordable.
While there is no clear evidence as yet that a middle-
out approachwill achieve the goal of large scale nation-
wide electronic health records, international experi-
ence, including England’s, suggests that neither a
purely top-down nor bottom-up approach is likely to
do so.
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WHAT WAS ALREADY KNOWN ON THIS TOPIC
In England the government launched a national programme to implement centrally procured,
standardised, detailed electronic health record systems throughout all 168 acute hospital
and 73 mental health trusts by 2010
This programme is considerably behind schedule
WHAT THIS STUDY ADDS
Interim results from the first, comprehensive, prospective, longitudinal evaluation of
implementing and adopting nationwide electronic health records in secondary care indicate
that a top-down, centrally driven policy to deliver standardised records systems to diverse
local NHS organisations has contributed to deployment delays and frustrations
The top-down approach has had to evolve to permit greater flexibility and local choice in
electronic health record systems and their delivery
A realistic timescale for achieving detailed electronic health records in secondary care must
recognise that it is an incremental and iterative process, requiring active engagement from
clinicians andmanagers, and it is likely to take many years to deliver all its potential benefits
The immediate priority is to clarify the type and scale of detailed electronic health records
that are wanted and affordable
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Data sharing: Additional supporting data drawn from the five, interim
case studies reported here are available on request from the
corresponding author (aziz.sheikh@ed.ac.uk).
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